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Judicial Deference to the Chief Executive's
Interpretation of the Immigration Reform
and Control Act of 1986
Antidiscrimination Provision: A
Circumvention of Constitutionally Prescribed
Legislative Procedure
I. INTRODUCTION
In an effort to remove the lure that attracts illegal aliens into the
United States,' the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986
(IRCA)2 imposes sanctions on employers who hire unauthorized
aliens.' Congress also included an antidiscrimination provision in the
IRCA out of a concern that "people of 'foreign' appearance might be
made more vulnerable by the imposition of [employer] sanctions" due
to the fact that "some employers may decide not to hire 'foreign'
appearing individuals to avoid sanctions." 4 This antidiscrimination
provision provides a private right of action against employers engag-
ing in unfair immigration-related employment practices involving
"knowing and intentional discriminatory activity or a pattern or prac-
tice of discriminatory activity" because of an individual's national ori-
gin or citizenship status.' The antidiscrimination provision does not
clearly state what burden of proof a plaintiff must meet in order to
prevail; it is ambiguous as to whether the plaintiff must prove inten-
tional discrimination (disparate treatment) or whether a pattern of
discrimination (disparate impact) will suffice.6
1. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 "establishes penalties for employers
who knowingly hire undocumented aliens, thereby ending the magnet that lures them into this
country .... This legislation seeks to close the back door on illegal immigration so that the
front door on legal immigration may remain open. The principal means of closing the back
door, or curtailing future illegal immigration, is through employer sanctions." H.R. REP. No.
682, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 45-46, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5649.
2. Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (to be codified in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.) [hereinafter IRCA].
3. IRCA § 101. The employer sanction provisions impose civil money penalties for
limited instances of employment of unauthorized aliens and criminal penalties and injunctions
for a pattern or practice of employment of unauthorized aliens. Id.
4. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5840.
5. IRCA § 102.
6. For a discussion of the origins, ramifications, and propriety of these standards under
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When President Reagan signed the IRCA into law, he concur-
rently signed a statement in which he gave his own interpretation of
various portions of the Act. The President has interpreted the
antidiscrimination provision to require a disparate treatment, or dis-
criminatory intent, standard of proof.8 This standard requires the
plaintiff to carry the burden of proof by showing intentional discrimi-
nation.9 President Reagan's view, however, is not the only possible
interpretation of the antidiscrimination provision. Congress appar-
ently intended to require the disparate impact burden of proof,10
the IRCA, see Comment, The Unfair Immigration-Related Employment Practices Provision: A
Modicum of Protection Against National Origin and Citizenship Status Discrimination, 41 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1025 (1987) [hereinafter Antidiscrimination Provision].
7. President's Statement on Signing S. 1200 into Law, 22 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
1534, 1534-37 (Nov. 6, 1986) [hereinafter President's Signing Statement].
8. In his statement accompanying the IRCA, President Reagan stated that he understood
section 102 "to require a 'discriminatory intent' standard of proof: the party bringing the
action must show that in the decision-making process the defendant's [employer's] action was
motivated by one of the prohibited criteria." Id. at 1535. The President continued that it
would, therefore, be improper to use the "disparate impact" burden of proof. Id. In
conclusion, the President stated:
[A] facially neutral employee selection practice that is employed without
discriminatory intent will be permissible under the provisions of [section 102].
For example, the section does not preclude a requirement of English language
skill or a minimum score on an aptitude test even if the employer cannot show a
"manifest relationship" to the job in question or that the requirement is a "bona
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of
that particular business or enterprise," so long as the practice is not a guise used
to discriminate on account of national origin or citizenship status. Indeed, unless
the plaintiff presents evidence that the employer has intentionally discriminated
on proscribed grounds, the employer need not offer any explanation for his
employee selection procedures."
Id.
9. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The Court held:
The complainant in a Title VII action must carry the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. This may be done by
showing (i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that,
despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from
persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802.
10. The drafters of the antidiscrimination provision proposed amendments allowing
private actions for intentional or repeated violations. Modifications to the Frank Amendment
Proposed by Mr. Mazzoli and/or Mr. Frank (n.d.) (available through Rep. Barney Frank's
office, Washington, D.C.). During formulation of the IRCA, the drafters made it known that
the antidiscrimination provision contemplated an action for both types of discriminatory
employment practices. Memorandum to Sen. Simpson from the Assistant to Rep. Barney
Frank (n.d.) (available through Rep. Barney Frank's office, Washington, D.C.). The disparate
impact burden developed in connection with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). When Congress considered the
antidiscrimination provision in the IRCA, it intended to broaden Title VII protections against
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which merely requires that the plaintiff prove an adverse impact from
discriminatory employment practices.'I
Because it is more difficult to prove discriminatory intent,1 2 an
employer charged with discrimination under the IRCA would clearly
prefer President Reagan's interpretation of the burden of proof. The
employer would argue that the standard in the IRCA is disparate
treatment, buttressing his claim with legislative intent, expressed as
"executive intent," gleaned from the President's signing statement.
Because the success of the antidiscrimination provision may depend
on the burden of proof that a plaintiff is required to satisfy, it is
important to determine the propriety of judicial deference to presiden-
tial interpretations in determining legislative intent.
Chief executives have historically used signing statements to evi-
dence their interpretations of bills. In 1830, President Andrew Jack-
son was concerned that a road appropriation measure would be
construed as authorizing funding for the construction of a road
beyond the Michigan territory. In his signing statement, the Presi-
dent stated that he was signing the bill with the understanding that
the authorized road would not exceed the boundaries of the Michigan
territory.1 3 President Ulysses S. Grant signed a similar statement
approving a river and harbor improvement appropriations bill. He
noted that his approval was conditioned on the expenditures under
the bill being for works of a national interest rather than of a purely
private or local interest. 4
discrimination based on national origin while not broadening other protections afforded under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 4, at 87. Thus, there is
ample legislative history by which a court could reasonably infer that Congress intended that
the antidiscrimination provision provides an action based on disparate impact as well as
discriminatory intent. Subsequent to the President's signing statement, individual members of
Congress voiced strong disagreement with the President's interpretation of the required burden
of proof, thereby expressing their understanding that the provisions do not require the plaintiff
to prove discriminatory intent. One congressman stated that he was "appalled at the
President's interpretation of the anti-discrimination provisions." Pear, Immigration Law Sets
Off Dispute Over Job Rights for Legal Aliens, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 1, col. 1.
Representative Barney Frank, drafter of the antidiscrimination provision, characterized the
President's interpretation as " 'intellectually dishonest, mean-spirited' and incorrect .... 'A
pattern or practice of discriminatory activity would violate the law even if you cannot prove
an intent to discriminate.' " Id. at 34, col. 1.
11. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-33 (1971) (finding that discriminatory
preference for any minority or majority is precisely what Congress proscribed, as it required
the removal of "artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification").
Id.
12. See Antidiscrimination Provision, supra pp. 1039-45.
13. 3 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1046 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
14. 9 id. at 4331.
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Although in the past presidents have issued statements in order
to evidence their understanding of statutes, the Reagan Administra-
tion has attempted, for the first time, to make such presidential state-
ments part of the materials that courts look to in determining the
legislative intent behind ambiguous laws. Attorney General Edwin
Meese III recently announced that the Justice Department was under-
taking a campaign to "improve statutory interpretation by making
clear the President's understanding of legislation at the time he signs a
bill.""5 The Justice Department made arrangements to publish presi-
dential signing statements in the US. Code Congressional and Admin-
istrative News in an attempt to facilitate judges' use of these
documents in determining legislative intent.17
Judicial attention to such signing statements is assertedly proper
because the President is an integral part of the legislative process."
The President often takes a stand on bills considered in Congress, and
the consitutional requirement of presentment 9 ensures the President
a role in the legislative process so that legislation is a product of both
Congress and the President.2"
15. Address by Attorney General Edwin Meese III to the National Press Club,
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 25, 1986) (transcript available through the United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.).
16. Id.
17. Strasser, Executive Intent, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 10, 1986, at 2, col. 3. The issue of judicial
deference to presidential signing statements in determining legislative intent behind statutes
has serious ramifications in light of the nature of today's legal system. During the twentieth
century, the United States legal system has developed from a largely common law creature into
an entity dominated by statutes. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative
Intent: A Venture into "Speculative Unrealities", 64 B.U.L. REV. 737 (1984). As Justice
Frankfurter has noted, "almost every Supreme Court case has a statute at its heart or close to
it." Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 527
(1947). In today's legal system, statutes are becoming increasingly important.
When courts have investigated legislative intent behind statutes, they have traditionally
determined what Congress meant in passing a law. Toobin, The Last Word, NEW REPUBLIC,
Nov. 3, 1986, at 13, 14. The Court has stated that in construing a statute, the judicial objective
is to "ascertain the congressional intent and give effect to the legislative will." Philbrook v.
Glodgett, 421 U.S. 707, 713 (1975) (emphasis added). For example, in determining the scope
of the tax exemption afforded by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, the Supreme
Court analyzed that section "against the background of the congressional purposes" and
concluded that Congress intended to provide tax benefits to organizations serving charitable
purposes and not to those that had racially discriminatory policies. Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, 461 U.S. 574, 586-88 (1983). Thus, judicial deference to presidential intent when courts
construe legislative intent would elevate the President's role in an increasingly important area
of the law.
18. Toobin, supra note 17, at 13, 14.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
20. Kmiec, Judges Should Pay Attention to Statements by President, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 10,
1986, at 13, col. 2. The author, Douglas W. Kmiec, is the Deputy Assistant Attorney General
in the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice.
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Presidential signing statements can often be used as "directive[s]
to subordinate executive officers in their implementation of stat-
utes."21 The "take care clause" 22 of the United States Constitution
imposes an affirmative duty on the President to direct his subordinate
officers in the faithful execution of the laws. The President, as chief
administrator, may guide executive officers "in their construction of
the statutes under which they act in order to secure... unitary execu-
tion of the laws."23 The President's understanding of legislation is
significant because, as chief executive officer, he oversees subordinates
who must yield to his paramount understanding of vaguely-worded
statutory authority.24
One argument in favor of judicial deference to executive intent is
efficiency. Deference to "executive intent" is arguably a useful device
for clearing up confusion about the meaning of ambiguously drafted
statutes or those provisions that are objectionable to the President.25
The Justice Department also supports judicial deference to executive
intent because such intent is more readily ascertainable than congres-
sional intent: the former avoids the fallacy of collective intent inher-
ent in the latter.26  According to this view, the legislative intent 27
21. Strasser, supra note 17, at 13, col. 1. In this respect, presidential signing statements are
analogous to executive orders, "directives of the president which are directed to, and govern
the actions of, governmental officials." Note, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of
Executive Orders, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44, 44 (1963).
22. Article II, section 3 of the Constitution states that the President shall "take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed."
23. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). In Myers, the Court held that the
President had the unrestricted power to remove the Postmaster General, a subordinate
executive officer charged with duties that are related to executive functions (rather than related
to legislative or judicial functions). Id. at 176. The Reagan Administration cites Myers as
standing for the proposition that the President has the authority to direct the action of
subordinate officers but concedes that it is unclear to what extent Congress may insulate
subordinates from presidential supervision. The assertion is that the President, as head of the
executive branch, is authorized by the "take care clause" of the Constitution (the President has
the power to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3) to
guide subordinate executive officers in the construction of statutes. Memorandum to David
Stockman, Director of the Office of Management and Budget from Assistant Attorney General
in the Office of Legal Counsel (Feb. 12, 1981) (available through the Office of Legal Counsel,
Washington, D.C.).
24. Kmiec, supra note 20, at 13, col. 1. In the exercise of the power to execute the laws,
"Article II of the Constitution evidently contemplated ... vesting general executive power in
the President alone." Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 135 (1926). The President may not,
however, alter the statutory language of legislation or interpret legislation so as to do violence
to its statutory terms. For instance, he may not direct an officer to file reports every forty-five
days if the officer is statutorily required to do so every thirty days. The Reagan
Administration recognizes this principle. Kmiec, supra note 20, at 13, col. 2.
25. Strasser, supra note 17, at 2, col. 3.
26. Kmiec, supra note 20, at 32, col. 2. "To some, distilling legislative 'intent' from the
words and history of a statute is nothing short of twentieth-century alchemy. Indeed, any
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expressed by individual members of Congress or even committees is
not necessarily representative of the intent espoused by that legislative
body as a whole, whereas the President's intent, derived from one
source, is easier to determine.
This Comment addresses the propriety of deference to presiden-
tial intent in determining legislative intent by analyzing the Presi-
dent's role in the legislative process. Part II of the Comment asserts
that the President's statement is legislative in character and effect.
Part III argues that the President has no legislative power under a
strict reading of the Constitution. Part IV explores the legislative pro-
cess and, more particularly, the President's limited role in that pro-
cess. Part V recognizes the President's power to direct actions of
subordinate executive officers and examines the President's statement
in light of this power. Finally, Part VI concludes that judicial defer-
member of Congress probably had his or her own particular reason for voting for or against
any given piece of legislation." United States v. Fulkerson, 631 F. Supp. 319, 323 n.6 (D.
Haw. 1986). Despite concern for complete accuracy behind a determination of the collective
intent of Congress, the district court in Fulkerson was, nevertheless, willing to utilize collective
intent in interpreting a statute. Id. at 323-24.
27. The judicial "plain-meaning rule" states that "where the language of an enactment is
clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or impracticable
consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of the meaning
intended." United States v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929). The Supreme Court
has employed this rule to preclude the use, as aids to statutory interpretation, of committee
reports and records of legislative history behind an act. Jones, The Plain Meaning Rule and
Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Federal Statutes, 25 WASH. U.L.Q. 2, 5 (1939). The rule,
however, was never as widely practiced as pronounced and courts avoided it by classifying
statutory words as "ambiguous," by finding that the plain meaning led to absurd results, or by
using legislative history to confirm the plain meaning of words. Murphy, Old Maxims Never
Die: The "Plain-Meaning Rule" and Statutory Interpretation in the "Modern" Federal Courts,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 1299, 1301 (1975).
The plain-meaning rule has since been used less frequently, as modern courts have turned
to legislative history in construing statutes. In fact, during its 1980-81 Term, the Supreme
Court decided more than one-third of its cases based on legislative history. Oaks & Smith,
Legislative Librarians Decode the Ways of Congress, Legal Times, June 14, 1982, at 15, col. 1.
As was expressed in one Supreme Court majority opinion: "When aid to construction of the
meaning of words, as used in the statute, is available, there certainly can be no 'rule of law'
which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on 'superficial examination.' "
United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc., 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940) (citing Boston
Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928); Helvering v. New York Trust Co.,
292 U.S. 455, 465 (1934)). Indeed, the Supreme Court appears to resort to the use of
legislative history in statutory construction even when language is not patently ambiguous.
The Court has recognized that when words of a statute are plain, it is oversimplification to
assert that the meaning of the statute is plain; therefore, the Court seeks to find the
interpretation of the statute that is most harmonious with congressionally manifested
purposes. FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 625 n.7 (1982); see also Church of the Holy Trinity
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the
letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the
intention of its makers."). Thus, it is apparent that the Court has come full circle and relies on
legislative history to determine congressional intent behind statutory provisions.
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ence to the President's understanding of the IRCA antidiscrimination
provision is unconstitutional as violative of the separation of powers
doctrine.
II. LEGISLATIVE EFFECT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
SIGNING STATEMENT
By asserting the requisite burden of proof under the IRCA, the
President's signing statement 28 is arguably legislative. Four years ago,
the Supreme Court visited the issue of legislative actions. In INS v.
Chadha,2 9 the Court considered the constitutionality of a one-house
veto of the Attorney General's determination that an alien should not
be deported. The majority found the veto to be "essentially legisla-
tive" because it had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative branch, includ-
ing those of Chadha, a lawfully admitted alien. 30 The Court held that
the one-house veto violated bicameral passage of legislation as
required by the Constitution.31 In reaching its conclusion, the Court
stated that whether actions are exercises of legislative power depends
not on their form, but on whether they are legislative in character and
effect.3 2
Although the Court has recognized that "interpreting a law
enacted by Congress to implement the legislative mandate is the very
essence of 'execution' of the law,"' 3 the President's statement declar-
ing the required standard of proof can be properly construed as legis-
lative under the Chadha definition because of its effect on the right to
work. The President's statement, if incorporated into the antidis-
crimination provision, would have a substantial effect on the right to
seek and hold employment. Under the President's construction of the
antidiscrimination provision, a plaintiff bringing a cause of action
under the provision would have to meet a higher burden of proof than
under the standard asserted by members of Congress. 4 Assuming the
more stringent discriminatory intent (disparate treatment) burden is
required, an employer would necessarily have greater latitude in hir-
28. For a discussion of the disparate treatment standard of proof asserted by the President,
see supra notes 7-9 and accompanying text. See also Antidiscrimination Provision, supra pp.
1045-46.
29. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
30. Id. at 952.
31. Id. at 946-59.
32. Id. at 952.
33. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3192 (1986).
34. For a discussion of the disparate impact standard of proof asserted by some members
of Congress, see supra notes 5, 6, 10-12 and accompanying text. See also Antidiscrimination
Provision, supra pp. 1046-50.
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ing or firing employees because employment requirements would need
less justification to survive under the IRCA.35 The resulting effect of
the increased evidentiary burden could be a reduction of the plaintiff-
employee's ability to find work and/or remain employed.
The right to work is a paramount liberty 36 protected by the due
process clause of the fifth amendment.37 Deprivation of liberty
accompanies "ineligibility for employment in a major sector of society
or the economy."' 38  The IRCA antidiscrimination provision was
expressly drafted to guard against employment-related discrimination
aimed at citizens and residents intending to become citizens: the
IRCA applies to citizens, nationals of the United States, or lawfully
admitted resident aliens evidencing an intent to become citizens.39
Because the fifth amendment extends its protections to resident aliens
as well as citizens,40 the interest protected under the antidiscrimina-
tion provision is the constitutionally protected right to work.
A plaintiff-employee's right to pursue an occupation is altered by
yielding to the President's interpretation of the burden of proof
required under the IRCA antidiscrimination provision. This altera-
tion of a right, therefore, characterizes the President's statement as
substantively legislative.
35. For a discussion of the application of the President's asserted standard of proof and the
contrary assertion of members of Congress, see supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text. For a
more detailed analysis, see Antidiscrimination Provision, supra pp. 1045-54.
36. Over 60 years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that liberty, without doubt, "denotes
... the right... to engage in any of the occupations of life." Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
399 (1923). The Court reaffirmed the Meyer decision in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 572 (1972) (fourteenth amendment does not require opportunity for a hearing before the
nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's contract absent a showing of deprivation of liberty
or property interest resulting from the nonrenewal). Justice Douglas has noted:
The right to work... [is] the most precious liberty that man possesses. Man has
indeed as much right to work as he has to live .... It does many men little good
to stay alive and free ... if they cannot work. To work means to eat. It also
means to live .... The great values of freedom are the opportunities afforded
man to press to new horizons, to pit his strength against the forces of nature, to
match skills with his fellow man.
Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U.S. 442, 472 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. Kwong Hai Chen v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 (1953).
38. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976). The right to work is also a
personal freedom protected by the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has stated that
"[i]t requires no argument to show that the right to work for a living in the common
occupations of the community is of the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity
that it was the purpose of the [fourteenth] Amendment to secure." Traux v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 41 (1915), cited with approval in Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 102 n.23.
39. IRCA § 102.
40. Kwong Hai Chen, 344 U.S. at 596.
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III. THE PRESIDENT DOES NOT HAVE LEGISLATIVE POWER
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,41 the Supreme Court
rejected the argument that the President has unlimited inherent legis-
lative power as a result of his position as chief executive. Holding
that the constitutional framework "refutes the idea that [the Presi-
dent] is to be a lawmaker," the majority stated that in addition to
limiting the President's role in the lawmaking process to recom-
mending laws he thinks wise and vetoing laws he thinks bad:
42
[T]he Constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make laws .... The first section of the first article says that "All
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States . . . ." After granting many powers to the Con-
gress, Article I goes on to provide that Congress may "make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execu-
tion the foregoing Powers and all other Powers vested by this Con-
stitution in the Government of the United States, or any
Department or Officer thereof. . .4"
The constitutional assignment of legislative power strictly forbids the
President to exercise legislative power by promulgating signing state-
ments to be used by courts to determine legislative intent.
IV. ARTICLE I BICAMERAL PASSAGE AND
PRESENTMENT REQUIREMENTS
The Constitution mandates that a bill be passed by both houses
of Congress and presented to the President for approval or veto before
it can become law. 44 In Chadha,45 the Supreme Court held that
actions which alter legal rights are legislative in effect and involve
determinations of policy that can only be implemented by bicameral
passage followed by presentment to the President.46 The President's
41. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
42. Id. at 587.
43. Id. at 587-88. Concurring in Youngstown, Justice Douglas also observed that while
some nations entrusted legislative power to the executive branch as a matter of course, the
United States chose another path in deciding to place the legislative function in Congress. He
further noted that the constitutional language assigning all legislative power to Congress is not
ambiguous or qualified. Id. at 630 (Douglas, J., concurring).
44. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 7.
45. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
46. Id. at 952-55. Justice Stevens has stated, in the context of the Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act, that where a resolution is
"intended to make policy that will bind the nation and thus is 'legislative in character and
effect,' " the full article I requirements must be observed. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181,
3204 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring). In Bowsher, the Court considered the constitutionality
of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act that
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signing statement, because of its legislative effect,47 must also meet
these Article I requirements.48
Judicial deference to the President's signing statement essentially
allows the President to have the last word 49 as to the meaning of the
antidiscrimination provision and the concomitant standard of proof
required. With respect to the IRCA, the burdens of proof urged by
Congress and the President may conflict, as the President asserts that
discriminatory intent is the exclusive burden of proof while members
of Congress state that proof of discriminatory intent is not neces-
sary.50 Because these two interpretations cannot be harmonized, the
courts must choose between the two: Because of their conflicting
natures, the different interpretations cannot be given equal effect. If
the courts give deference to the President's construction, his interpre-
tation will necessarily be superior to that of Congress and will be
interjected into the IRCA. Such deference creates a single legislative
house as it enables the President alone to control the meaning of legis-
lation. 1 In essence this deference vests the legislative power in the
Oval Office. This single legislative house would violate the bicameral
passage requirement, circumventing the constitutional framework for
representative legislation52 and protections of freedom. 3
The President's role in the lawmaking process is limited to the
permitted Congress to retain control over the Comptroller General's actions in the execution
of the law. The Court held that this active role of Congress in the execution of law was
unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because Congress had
usurped executive branch functions. Id. at 3189.
47. For a characterization of the President's statement as legislative, see supra notes 28-40
and accompanying text.
48. The President's signing statement may not seem to be legislative until its operational
effect is considered. As Justice Stevens noted, however, in considering whether an action is
required to meet the article I stipulations, " 'the nature and substance [of the action], and not
its form, controls the question of its disposition.' " Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3204
(1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing S. REP. No. 1335, 54th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1897)). The
executive branch may claim the signing statement to be an executive action, yet because the
President's interpretation of the required burden of proof affects the right to work, it is
legislative in character and should, therefore, be analyzed as such.
49. The Administration goes so far as to assert that executive intent should be given
greater weight than congressional intent. Steven Calabresi, Special Assistant to Attorney
General Meese, stated: "The president explaining what a law means has a lot more value than
what a senator or congressman has to say." Toobin, supra note 17, at 13, 14. Where, as is the
case with the burden of proof required to sustain an action under the IRCA antidiscrimination
provision, congressional and executive intent conflict, the Administration's view would require
courts to give effect only to the Executive's intent. Such an outcome would seriously impinge
on Congress's legislative power.
50. For the President's position and the conflicting views of members of Congress, see
supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
51. For a discussion of the legislative effect of the President's interpretation, see supra
notes 28-40 and accompanying text.
52. James Madison noted that "[1]egislative power is exercised by an assembly ... which is
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recommendation of laws that he feels are necessary and the veto of
laws he thinks unwise.54 He does not draft legislation or vote on it.
The framers of the Constitution did not intend the Executive to act as
a forum for initiation of "executive legislation" separate and distinct
from legislation created by Congress." The President may not, acting
under the presentment requirement, sign a bill into law and concur-
rently declare that Congress's policy and provisions are nullified by
his policy and provisions. The presentment clause permits the Presi-
dent to sign a bill if he approves of it; otherwise he is authorized to
return it with his objections for reconsideration by Congress.56 In
such a case, Congress then has the opportunity to consider the Presi-
sufficiently numerous to feel all of the passions which acuate a multitude." THE FEDERALIST
No. 48, at 334 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
53. Bicameral passage by the individual houses of Congress is required to "assure[ ] that
the legislative power would be exercised only after opportunity for full study and debate in
separate settings." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). Those involved in the
Constitutional Convention were concerned about the aggregation of legislative power. James
Wilson warned that if legislative power went unrestrained there could be neither liberty nor
stability. In a single house there is no check on legislation except the "virtue and good sense of
those who compose it." 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (M.
Farrand ed. 1937). James Madison asserted that a diversity of representation of the multiple
interests in society is the only way to secure against oppression from a centralized government.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347-53 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Alexander Hamilton
stated that accumulation of power in a single congress would "create in reality the very
tyranny" that the Constitution was designed to guard against. THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at
145 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). The framers were well aware of the dangers to be
avoided by dividing the legislative body into two houses. They were aware, as was Joseph
Story, that a single legislative body, "like private persons, [is] occasionally under the dominion
of strong passions and excitements; impatient, irritable, and impetuous .... If [legislative
power] feels no check but its own will, it rarely has the firmness to insist upon holding a
question long enough under its own view, to see and mark it in all its bearings and relations on
society." 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 29-30
(1833).
54. INS v. Chada, 462 U.S. 919, 947-48 (1983); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579, 585-88 (1952).
55. Alexander Hamilton described the motivation for allowing the President a role in
lawmaking as being a concern that the President should be able to protect himself from single
votes of Congress and a need for a check against Congress's passing bad laws. However, there
is no mention of permitting the President to have anything more than a negative role. THE
FEDERALIST No. 73, at 494-95 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Indeed, James Madison
noted, in observing the distribution of power in our government, that "[t]he magistrate in
whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a
negative on every law." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. The President does not have to sign or object but instead can
let the bill lapse. Ten days after presentment, the bill becomes law if the President does not
act. Id. One possible solution to this restrictive procedure may be to allow the President to
exercise a "one-line" veto. The chief executive could then express reservations about
ambiguous or unsatisfactory statutory provisions before the law is enacted, thereby affording
Congress the opportunity to more clearly express its legislative directive. Under such a
practice, there would be less opportunity for presidential/congressional conflict over the
meaning of provisions subsequent to the enactment of a law.
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dent's objections and to override his veto by a two-thirds vote in each
house. 7 This constitutional procedure does not permit executive pol-
icy substitution or the interjection of presidential definitions into the
bill's final legal form. 8
When President Reagan signed the IRCA into law, he accepted
the bill and affirmed any policy choices made by Congress. Congress
had the ultimate decision whether or not to incorporate provisions
into the IRCA. Congress considered the antidiscrimination provision
necessary to assure that employers' fears of the IRCA sanctions for
hiring illegal aliens59 would not precipitate discrimination against
foreign-appearing persons.6 ° Congress's choice of the burden of proof
necessary to sustain an action under the antidiscrimination provision
reflects congressional policy that goes to the heart of the IRCA's
operation. Any executive disagreement concerning congressional pol-
icy underlying the provision should have been expressed (possibly
through lobbying or a sympathetic voice on the floor of Congress)
before the President signed the IRCA.61
In Wright v. United States,62 the Court noted that the constitu-
tional provisions governing both the presidential veto and the con-
gressional override serve two fundamental functions: (1) to provide
the President with an opportunity to consider bills presented to him;
and (2) upon executive veto, to provide Congress with an opportunity
to consider the President's objections, and if desirable, pass legislation
over them.63 The Court has also described these constitutional man-
dates as explicit terms that define the respective roles of Congress and
the President in the legislative process. 64 Such unambiguous constitu-
tional procedures can only mean that Congress has the final authority
to control what provisions and policies become law. After enactment,
the President is bound by congressional policy and intent. Post-enact-
ment executive policy and, therefore, executive intent behind the
57. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
58. Constitutional requirements for the operation of the legislative process should be
strictly adhered to because, as the Court has noted, the draftsmen of the Constitution "took
special pains to assure that these [article I] requirements could not be circumvented." INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-47 (1983). These constitutional protections were designed to
ensure "that the legislative power of the Federal Government be exercised in accord with a
single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure." Id. at 951.
59. IRCA § 101.
60. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1000, supra note 4, at 87.
61. Congressional policy was expressed during drafting of the antidiscrimination
provision. See supra note 10.
62. 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
63. Id. at 596.
64. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983).
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IRCA, is irrelevant when discerning the meaning of the antidis-
crimination provision.
V. DELEGATION OF QUASI-LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY TO THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL AND PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF
THAT DELEGATED POWER
The IRCA amends as well as adds provisions to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA).65 Under the INA, the Attorney General
is delegated the power to issue regulations necessary for the
enforcement of the INA.66 The IRCA, as an amendment to the INA,
extends such delegated power to promulgate regulations. In other
words, Congress has granted the Attorney General legislative
power.67
In exercising this delegated power, the delegatee must follow
Congress's policy choices. 6 This fundamental administrative law
65. IRCA § 1.
66. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (1982). The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is the
final depository of the Attorney General's delegated power to promulgate regulations with
legislative effect. Id. § 1103(a)-(b). For simplification, analysis herein is confined to the power
delegated to the Attorney General. The analysis is not altered by the fact that the Attorney
General confers his powers to the INS. As the ultimate delegatee of legislative power, the INS
is subject to the same constraints as is the attorney general in exercising this power.
67. This delegation of legislative power is not constitutionally required to meet the article
I, § 7 bicameral passage and presentment requirements because, as discussed below, a check is
provided by adherence to congressional policy. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983);
see infra note 79.
68. When a legislative body delegates legislative power to a regulatory entity, such
delegation must contain guidelines to prevent arbitrary action by the delegatee. In Seattle Title
Trust Co. v. Roberge, a building superintendent denied the plaintiff's application for a
building permit under a zoning ordinance that required consent by owners of two-thirds of the
property surrounding a proposed philanthropic home for children or elderly people. 278 U.S.
116, 117-19 (1928). The Court held that this delegation of governmental regulatory power to
the adjoining land owners was repugnant to the fourteenth amendment due process clause
because the delgation was "uncontrolled by any standard or rule prescribed by legislative
action." Id. at 120-22; see also Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137, 141-44 (1912)
(striking down a comparable ordinance under the fourteenth amendment because it conferred
the power to control and dispose of the property rights of others and "create[d] no standard by
which the power thus given [was] to be exercised"). In Yakus v. United States, the Court
considered the constitutionality of a delegation of legislative power to the Price Administrator
to control wartime commodity prices. 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944). The delegation defined facts
and conditions that the delegatee was to use in controlling prices. The Court held the
delgation valid because Congress's policy could be inferred from the statutory framework and
this policy marked the field in which the delegatee could act. Id.
This long-standing delegation principle was more recently recognized in Eastlake v.
Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668 (1976). In Eastlake, the Court stated that
"congressional delegation of power to a regulatory entity must be accompanied by discernible
standards, so that the delegatee's action can be measured for its fidelity to the legislative will."
Id. at 675. The Court recognized Roberge and Eubank, but noted that in Eastlake it was not
dealing with power delegated "to a narrow segment of the community" but rather with power
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principle assures that Congress alone will make the important policy
decisions affecting the nation.69  The more recent delegation cases
have allowed delegation of legislative power to the executive branch
with undetailed expressions of congressional policy, 70 suggesting that
the executive branch is afforded more latitude to formulate policies
consistent with the overall goals of the organic statute. A caveat to
such an assertion, however, is the fact that the Court still requires
detailed delegation, and clearer expressions of congressional policy,
when the statute delegates power to regulate a personal right.71
initially reserved to the people. Id. at 677. In considering the validity of a city charter
amendment that required public ratification of changes in land use approved by the City
Council (the city's legislative body), the Court stated that the issue of adherence to legislative
policy was inapplicable because that issue only arises under a delegation of power by a
legislative body to a regulatory entity not directly responsible to the people. By distinguishing
Roberge and Eubank, the Court recognized the vitality of the rule that delegation of legislative
power requires that the delegatee follow policy choices of the legislative entity. Accord
Silverman v. Barry, 727 F.2d 1121, 1126 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Given the opportunity to overrule
...Eubank and Roberge, the [Eastlake] Court chose instead to distinguish them.... The
court majority appeared to accept Eubank and Roberge as still valid precedent ... .
69. The Court has recognized:
The Congress manifestly is not permitted to abdicate, or to transfer to others, the
essential legislative functions with which it is thus vested .... The Constitution
has never been regarded as denying the Congress the necessary resources of
flexibility and practicality which will enable it to perform its function in laying
down policies ...while leaving to selected instrumentalities the making of
subordinate rules within prescribed limits .... But the constant recognition of
the necessity . ..of such provisions ... cannot be allowed to obscure the
limitations of the authority to delegate, if our constitutional system is to be
maintained.
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935). Justice Rehnquist has noted that an
important function of requiring delegatees to adhere to congressional policy is ensuring that
"important choices of social policy are made by Congress, the branch of our Government most
responsive to the popular will." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). He also stated that this require-
ment is compelled by the separation of powers doctrine. Id. at 675.
70. "[R]estrictions on the scope of the power that could be delegated diminished and all
but disappeared." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 985 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); see also B.
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 2.6 (2d ed. 1984) (noting that in Lichter v. United
States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948), the Court held that Congress's direction to recover "excessive
profits" was a sufficient standard to provide guidance and delegate power to administrative
officers to renegoiate war contracts).
71. Justice Brennan has qualified the Court's permission of broad delegation, warning that
"[t]he area of permissible indefiniteness narrows, however, when the regulation ... potentially
affects fundamental rights .... [V]ague legislative directives .. to an executive officer ... are
far more serious when liberty and the exercise of fundamental rights are at stake." United
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring). Robel involved a statute
under which a member of the Communist Party was indicted for unlawfully accepting
employment in a shipyard. The Subversive Activities Control Act delegated authority to the
Secretary of Defense to designate areas as "defense facilities," and thereby trigger the statute.
The defendant claimed that the statute allowed the Secretary too much discretion. The Court
held that when first amendment rights are at stake, Congress must adequately impose
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Assuming that the Attorney General was to exercise his delegated
legislative power and issue regulations concerning the standard of
proof required under the IRCA antidiscrimination provision, he
would have to follow congressional policy. This policy would need to
be clearly expressed because of the effect of the IRCA and corre-
sponding regulations on the constitutionally protected right to
work.72
Congressional policy and guidelines for delegation, however,
may be inferred from legislative history. 73 Arguably, Congress may
have intended the disparate impact standard to apply under the
antidiscrimination provision.74 If so, the Attorney General must
defer to this policy in issuing regulations on the required burden of
proof. The burden of proof issued under the delegated authority must
comport with that intended by Congress.
Although the President may guide subordinate executive officers
in their construction of laws,75 his control extends only to purely exec-
utive officers.76 In issuing regulations on the required standard of
proof, the Attorney General performs a quasi-legislative function 77
boundaries so that the delegatee does not have wide discretion to diminish those rights. Id. at
265-67. In Kent v. Dulles, Congress delegated power to the Secretary of State to grant and
issue passports. 357 U.S. 116 (1958). The Secretary issued regulations denying passports to
members of the Communist Party although a contemporaneous federal statute required
passports for travel. The Court noted that denial of the passport was control over exit, which
the Court recognized as a personal right within the meaning of liberty protected by the fifth
amendment. Id. at 129. In holding that a broad delegation was insufficient to deprive a person
of a constitutionally protected right, the Court stated that the specificity of delegation comes
under narrow scrutiny when liberty is regulated. Id.
Delegation of power to restrict first amendment rights was held to be overly broad,
however, in Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969). The Court recognized that
delegations of power to issue regulations restricting constitutionally guaranteed freedoms
require more than broad congressional directives to guide the restricting authority and
anything else is insufficient under the Constitution. Id. at 150-51.
72. See supra notes 36-40 and accompanying text.
73. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 675
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
74. See supra note 10. But see Antidiscrimination Provision, supra pp. 1046-50.
75. Myers v. United States, 277 U.S. 52, 135 (1926).
76. Presidential control does not extend to subordinates exercising quasi-judicial power.
Myers, 277 U.S. at 135. The Supreme Court subsequently amplified this distinction and
explicitly limited the President's control as being dependent on the character of the
subordinate's office. Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 631-32 (1935).
77. In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, the Court considered the President's ability
to remove a commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The Court
held that the commissioner, who functioning as an expert, filled in details about rules and
made rulings concerning "unfair methods of competition," acted partly in a quasi-legislative
and partly in a quasi-judicial capacity. Id. at 628. An officer who carries legislative policies
into effect and performs duties as a legislative aide cannot be classified as an extension of the
executive branch, but rather performs a quasi-legislative function that is free from executive
control. Id. Although the Attorney General operates in his article II executive capacity under
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and is not acting in apurely executive role. Regulations establishing a
burden of proof would alter the right to work just as the President's
interpretation does. Thus, the Attorney General's actions should be
properly characterized as legislative because the regulations alter a
legal right.78  The Attorney General is not subject to presidential
control in exercising his delegated power. He is subject to the policy
and will of Congress as his office and the courts may interpret it.79
The President, as chief executive, may not determine the Attorney
General's "legislative" construction of the anti-
discrimination provision in issuing regulations. Therefore, the Presi-
dent's understanding of the provision should be irrelevant in promul-
gating regulations and hence, is of similarly questionable relevance to
the courts in determining legislative intent behind the IRCA. This
irrelevance precludes judicial deference to the President's signing
statement and directs inquiry toward pure congressional intent.
VI. CONCLUSION
The President's understanding of legislation may be more readily
ascertainable than congressional intent and may avoid problems
the Immigration and Nationality Act, his actions under delegated authority from Congress
resemble lawmaking and have legislative effect. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983).
78. For a discussion of the legislative characterization of acts that affect rights, see supra
notes 28-40 and accompanying text; infra note 79 and accompanying text.
79. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953-54 n. 16. The Attorney General, as well as agencies, may take
action resembling lawmaking. This action, however, is not an exercise of "legislative" power.
The Attorney General's action is not subject to the bicameral/presentment process because his
action may not extend beyond the limits of the statute that created the power; a statute duly
enacted under article I, sections 1, 7. The Attorney General thus acts in his article II executive
capacity, checked by terms of the legislation that authorized his "legislative action." Actions
that are legislative in character and effect, and that are not so checked by congresssional policy
(such as the one-house veto), must meet the article I, sections 1, 7 enactment requirements. Id.
This result is consistent with the long-standing decision of Kendall v. United States, in which
the Court rejected a claim of presidential control over a subordinate officer acting under
statutory authority, stating:
It was urged at the bar, that the [subordinate executive officer] was alone
subject to the direction and control of the President . . . and this right of the
President is claimed, as growing out of the obligation imposed upon him by the
constitution, to take care that the laws be faithfully executed. This is a doctrine
that cannot receive the sanction of this Court ... [as it] would be clothing the
President with the power entirely to control the legislation of congress.
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 612 (1838). Clearly, in issuing regulations concerning the required stan-
dard of proof, the Attorney General would be taking action that is legislative in effect even
though he would be acting in an executive capacity. Such action is not validated by the consti-
tutional requirements of bicameral passage and presentment, but instead is upheld by its char-
acter as an instrument of congressional policy. In issuing such regulations, the Attorney
General is subject to congressional will, not the direction of the President. For a detailed
analysis of congressional intent behind the IRCA antidiscrimination provision, see generally
,ntidiscrimination Provision, supra p. 1025.
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inherent in determining collective intent;8 0 yet these attributes do not
remove judicial deference to presidential statements from constitu-
tional scrutiny."' The Constitution's framework for government was
designed to provide schematic procedural protections of freedom. 2
The federal legislative power was entrusted to Congress because of
80. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
81. The Supreme Court has espoused the belief that "[tihe hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power, even to
accomplish desirable objectives, must be resisted." INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
Justice White, in his dissent in Chadha, contended that the use of a one-house veto should have
been upheld, even in light of constitutional challenges, because it was "efficient, convenient,
and useful [and was] an important ... invention that allow[ed] the President and Congress to
resolve major constitutional and policy differences." Id. at 972 (White, J., dissenting). In
acknowledging but rejecting this argument, the majority countered that "policy arguments
supporting even useful political inventions are subject to the demands of the Constitution
which defines powers and, with respect to [the legislative process], sets out just how those
powers are to be exercised." Id. at 945. The Court also warned that "the fact that a given
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing
alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not
the primary objectives-or the hallmarks-of democratic government." Id. at 944. The Court
went on to state:
[I]t is crystal clear from the records of the Convention . . . that the framers
ranked other values higher than efficiency. The records of the Convention and
debates in the states preceding ratification underscore the common desire to
define and limit the exercise of the newly created federal powers affecting the
states and the people. There is an unmistakable [sic] expression of a
determination that legislation by the national Congress be a step-by-step,
deliberate and deliberative process .... The choices we discern as having been
made in the Constitutional Convention impose burdens on governmental
processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even unworkable, but those hard
choices were consciously made by men who had lived under a form of
government that permitted arbitrary governmental acts to go unchecked. There
is no support in the Constitution or decisions of this Court for the proposition
that the cumbersomeness and delays often encountered in complying with
explicit constitutional standards may be avoided ... by the President. With all
of the obvious flaws of delay, untidiness, and potential for abuse, we have not yet
found a better way to preserve freedom than by making the exercise of
[legislative] power subject to the carefully crafted restraints spelled out in the
Constitution.
Id. at 958-59.
82. In noting that there are governments without protections such as those that exist in the
United States Constitution, Justice Frankfurter stated, "It has not been our tradition to envy
such governments. In any event our government was designed to have such restrictions. The
price was deemed not too high in view of the safeguards which these restrictions afford."
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). The framers of the Constitution were concerned that when legislative and
executive powers are united in the same body, the potential for tyrannical government and
infringement of liberties is omnipresent. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison) (J.
Cooke ed. 1961); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("[T]he Constitution diffuses power to better secure liberty."). The doctrine of
separation of powers was not adopted to yield efficiency but to prevent exercise of arbitrary
power through inevitable friction between branches of government. Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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that body's particular ability to promulgate laws in response to the
needs of the governed constituents, a quality lacking in the chief exec-
utive.8 3 Deference to the President's intent behind the IRCA antidis-
crimination provision is inappropriate because of the President's
constitutionally limited role in lawmaking. Judicial deference to exec-
utive intent elevates the President to a substantive legislative role, cir-
cumvents the specifically prescribed constitutional plan for the
exercise of legislative power, and contravenes basic constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the doctrine of separation of powers; a doctrine
that is an integral part of the Constitution. 4 To abide by the Consti-
tution and preserve the integrity of the lawmaking process, courts
should not give deference to the President's purported belief of the
intent behind the antidiscrimination provision or to the announced
standard of proof evidenced by his signing statement. In the words of
Professor Linde, "[i]f this republic is to be remembered in the distant
history of law, it is likely to be for its enduring adherence to legitimate
institutions and processes, not for its perfection of unique principles of
83. Justice Douglas noted the distinction between the actions and processes involved in
presidential and congressional decisions: "All executive power-from the reign of ancient
kings to the rule of modem dictators-has the outward appearance of efficiency. Legislative
power, by contrast, is slower to exercise. There must be delay while the ponderous machinery
of committees, hearings, and debates is put into motion." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343
U.S. at 629 (Douglas, J., concurring). Out of necessity, Congress acts differently than the
President "as issues are debated, compromises made, consensus built, and differences between
the two houses reconciled." Rosenburg, Beyond the Limits of Executive Power: Presidential
Control of Agency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 80 MICH. L. REv. 193, 201
(1981).
Another crucial difference concerns the relative openness of the two branches to
public scrutiny. While legislation is subject to an on-the-record public debate,
only the final outcome of executive decision-making need be disclosed. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has held that the President has a constitutionally protected
interest in the confidentiality of communications with his chief advisors
[suggesting] that the President is best suited to act in emergency situations, where
speed is at a premium, and in foreign affairs, where an open decision-making
process might damage the national interest ....
Id. at 201-02.
84. The framers of the Constitution considered checks and balances the foundation of a
structure of government that would protect liberty. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181, 3186
(1986); see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 124 (1975) ("The principle of separation of
powers was not simply an abstract generalization in the minds of the Framers: it was woven
into the document they drafted in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787."). Constitutional
requirements of bicameral passage, presentment for veto, and veto override by Congress are
"integral parts of the constitutional design for the separation of powers." INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 945-46 (1983); cf Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst.,
448 U.S. 607, 675 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (The requirement that a delegatee of
legislative power follow congressional will is compelled by the doctrine of separation of
powers.). By circumventing these designs, judicial deference to the President's understanding
of the burden of proof required by the IRCA antidiscrimination provision permits legislation
free from constitutional protections of liberty.
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justice and certainly not for the rationality of its laws. "85
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85. Linde, Due Process in Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 255 (1976). Although
addressing the issue of reasonableness behind legislation, these remarks are equally applicable
to the situation here, where a proposed practice circumvents constitutionally prescribed
procedures for lawmaking.
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